The success of radical right, anti-immigrant political parties and the recent riots in France are only two of the more publicized examples of how volatile the issue of immigration has become across Western Europe. It is often believed that the dichotomy between racism and anti-racism is quite clear. Right-wing and center-right parties and their electoral constituencies are less accepting of immigrants, while center-left and left-wing political parties and their supporters are more accommodating. In this paper, however, I argue that this distinction is not as clear as it is often perceived. Using Italy as my case study, I outline the various ideological positions on the left and the right, and within the left and right, vis-à-vis immigration legislation and important related issues such as integration and multiculturalism. In the second section, I then examine how these ideological positions respond to the realities of immigration and to new pressures from voters within civil society. The question is whether immigration has created a new electoral dilemma for both sides of the political spectrum. I examine whether: 1) left-wing parties are experiencing pressures from their traditional working class constituencies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law-and-order. How does this mesh with more liberal attitudes regarding policies that permit immigrants to enter, find work, and integrate into society? 2) The question is whether right-wing political forces are also experiencing an electoral dilemma between center-right voters who support less liberal immigrant legislation and their traditional business constituency who support center-right economic policy but also realize that they require immigrant labour.
Introduction
Immigration, and related issues such as integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism, dominates much of the current academic and journalistic discussions concerning European politics. The subject matter is often contentious and controversial: from violent attacks on ethnic minorities, to the arrival of illegal immigrants off the shores of Italy and Spain, to the electoral success of anti-immigrant radical right populist parties in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, and Holland. Immigration to Europe and migration within Europe has a long history. The post 1945 economic boom was, in part, driven by internal migration and by the arrival of non-European labour. In the 1970s, when northern European countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and France stopped their active recruitment of foreign labour, discussions turned to issues of residency rights, citizenship, asylum, and family reunification. and political rights and working class voters who fear that immigration precipitates crime and insecurity, creates unfair competition for employment, and overburdens the welfare state. I also point out that the right is not immune to its own electoral dilemma. It must deal with tensions among supporters of right-wing populist parties that want to limit immigration, public fears concerning immigration and crime, business leaders who recognize the need for immigrant labour, and center-right Christian democratic voters who supported more humanitarian treatment of new arrivals.
I then turn my attention to the evolution of Italian immigration policy in order to investigate whether the empirical evidence demonstrates that such an electoral dilemma exists. Since Italy's transition to an immigrant receiving country in the 1980s, it has passed a series of immigration laws. I examine Italy's first immigration law in 1986 (Law 943), the Martelli Law (1990), the Turco-Napolitano Law (1998), and finally the controversial Bossi-Fini Law (2002) in order to scrutinize the degree to which the left and the right have faced internal divisions and contradictory pressures from within civil society while attempting to contend with the momentous social, political, and policy changes involved in the transition to an immigrant receiving society.
The Politics and the Political Economy of Immigration
Gary Freeman argued in 1995 that immigration policy in industrialized countries is expansionist (1995) . Despite surges of anti-immigrant sentiments, immigrant receiving states have avoided anti-immigrant populist sentiments since immigration policy is drafted behind closed doors. He claims that immigration policy is driven by "organized interest groups, usually, 'employers, ethnic advocacy groups, and civil and human rights organization.' (Perlmutter, 375) ." According to this argument, immigration policy has been immune from "irrational" populist forces within civil society intent on limiting immigration. Freeman refers to this as a theory of client politics (Perlmutter, 375, Freeman, 888 (1996, 376) ." It is my argument that this is precisely what has occurred in Europe since the 1980s. The "client" nature of immigration policy formation has been challenged, on both the left and the right, by political parties that have politicized immigration. This is not to imply that immigration policy is necessarily becoming more exclusionary, rather, the point is that the policy process is increasingly exposed to competing political forces, debate, and conflict.
Several political and economic developments have facilitated these changes.
There has been a gradual de-alignment of the dominant post war Christian Democratic and Social Democratic catch-all parties. Smaller Green parties, on the left, and radical right parties, on the right, have challenged the ability of catch-all parties to control the political agenda (Kriesi, Kitschelt) . Center-right parties are forced to respond to fears of radical right parties and their supporters concerning immigration and claims that new arrivals increase crime, unemployment, and threaten national identity. Green parties have also challenged the hegemony of Social Democratic parties on the left, by pushing for more inclusive immigration and citizenship policy.
The political economy of the post-Fordist era must also be taken into consideration. As Enrico Pugliese emphasizes, during the heyday of post war migration the Fordist model of production prevailed. Fordism accounted for the integration of the workers into the work force and into the working class: "As far as these migrations are concerned, industrial development in the core countries has been the motor of the labour demand and the migratory inflows. The labour demand in the manufacturing sector (besides mining and the construction industry) was the factor activating population movements. This does not mean of course that all immigrants everywhere entered industrial employment." However, it does hold true that "for the majority of the intra-European migrants, industrial employment was certainly the main destination (1993, 317) ."
The crisis of the post war Fordist model has important implications for current migration patterns, labour demand, and for occupational and social structure. The demise of post war levels of demand, productivity, and growth are countered with the often precarious nature of employment, the heterogeneous origin of international migrants, and the predominance of employment in the secondary economy (Pugliese, 61) .
The demise of post war levels of demand, productivity, and growth are countered with the often precarious nature of employment, the heterogeneous origin of international migrants, and the predominance of employment in the secondary economy. The volatility of this post-Fordist economic context is exacerbated by the declining hegemony of the catchall party, the emergence of radical right and Green political parties, and competing understandings of citizenship and belonging. It is within this post-Fordist socio-political climate that immigration policy has moved from the dark corridors of parliament committees to the often populist and emotionally charged public sphere.
Does an Electoral Dilemma Exist?
Although the potential for internal divisions within the left and the right existed vis-à-vis immigration under the post war model of immigration (Veugelers, 38) In an important analysis of inclusion and exclusion in Europe, Sniderman et al. conclude that "the fundamental cleavage over the value of order and authority is thus not between the left and the right, but within the left itself. (2000, 119) ." The authors question whether the politicization of immigration has created an important rift within the left between those that favour policy that grants immigrants more social and political rights and those who fear that immigration is linked to crime, unemployment, and a risk to national identity. Sniderman et al. predict that "as the issue of immigration moves to the center of public argument, public debate . . . it will be framed in terms that advantage the political right, with considerations of order, tradition, and national integrity coming to the fore (2000, 119) ."
What about the right? Does a potential electoral dilemma also exist for the right?
According to Perlmutter, an important tension exists within the center-right between cultural conservatives who call for stricter immigration controls and employers who demand more immigrants (1996, 377) In the Italian case, the left, and its union organizations, have not attempted to exploit immigration for the purpose of creating a nativist, exclusionary politics of selfdefense, as occurred in several other European countries (Rydgren, Schain) . Instead, unions and left wing activists within civil society were instrumental in assisting immigrants with housing, employment, and education. This position stems from both ideology and from a general pragmatism. The Italian labour unions have always held a progressive position vis-à-vis the so-called Third World, while they also recognized that, due to a decline in industrial employment and an aging population, the future of unions will depend upon immigrant labour. The growing presence of immigrants in Italy is reflected in higher levels of unionization. The highest number of unionized immigrants can be found in the CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour) with over 100.000
members. The unions have responded with internal measures to coordinate immigrant labour at the regional and the provincial levels (Macioti and Pugliese, 84) . Catholic organizations such as Caritas were also essential in providing social services and shelter to immigrants. These organizations were especially important in the early stages of immigration to Italy. They provided help to immigrants before there was adequate legislation and they lobbied the government to increase the legal status and to grant social and civil rights to immigrants. Republican Party attempted to exploit immigration (Perlmutter, .
Improvement to Law 943: towards the Martelli Law
It is important to note that political opposition to the proposed immigration law coincided with the rise of the Lega Nord. The Lega Nord, under the leadership of Umberto Bossi, was an amalgamation of the smaller regional protest leagues that had become increasingly powerful in the late 1980s and the early 1990s in northern Italy.
Although the early political message of the Lega emphasized regional devolution, criticizing Rome, the Italian State, and the southernization of the Italian state, early signs of anti-immigrant sentiments were already visible in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
In other words, political space for exclusionary, anti-immigrant politics was opening up.
However, despite these efforts by the Republican Party, the mainstream political parties, the Communist and the Catholic parties, avoided the issue. This was even the case for the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano. At this point in time, the Republican Party's attempt to politicize immigration failed. Eventually, with minor revisions, the Martelli Law was passed in 1990. In short, although these represented only initial steps, the law succeeded in granting asylum seekers legal rights. It broadened residence categories and permitted non-EU migrants to enter for reasons of tourism, education, health, and work. It established employment quotas in consultation with unions and employers. It clarified expulsion procedures. And it announced a second amnesty in order to attempt to legalize illegal workers (Calavita, 386, Veugelers, 42) .
The Second Republic and the Politicization of Immigration
As our discussion to this point has emphasized, the first phase of immigration policy (Law 943 and the Martelli Law) can be characterized as largely consensual. As
Italy evolved into an immigrant receiving country, it passed legislation that began to address issues of entry, residence, work, asylum, immigrant rights, and border controls.
Although there were early signs of potential anti-immigrant mobilization, in general mainstream political parties sought a cross-party consensus.
However, unlike in the 1980s, in the 1990s social and political forces intent upon politicizing immigration increased. This was due to several domestic and international developments. 1) The Italian political crisis in 1992, and the demise of the party system that dominated the post war period, meant that smaller parties were, subsequently, able to politicize issues that were previously avoided by the Christian Democratic and the (Zincone 2002, 62) . Despite these initiatives, MSI, and its successor party Alleanza Nazionale, took a more moderate line vis-à-vis immigration than other European radical right parties. This was rather surprising given its fascist heritage and given that research has consistently demonstrated that its membership expresses deep concerns over immigration (Ignazi, 343) . To be sure, the MSI, and later on AN, did not completely ignore immigration. During the 1990s there was a consistent attempt to link immigration with crime and with illegal immigration. AN officials and members have also participated in anti-immigrant protests at the local level. However, there is a general consensus among scholars that AN left considerable space for other political forces to exploit and politicize immigration.
There is little question that most successful attempts to politicize immigration came from the Lega Nord. Throughout the 1990s, but especially after 1996, the Lega Nord's objections to immigration and the radicalization of its anti-immigrant discourse took advantage of the reluctance of Alleanza Nazionale to politicize immigration. Porta points out that "Particularly after 1992, the public discourse on immigration came to be dominated by the links between immigration and crime." She emphasizes that, "In many large cities, above all in the center-north, committees of citizens mobilized around the theme of crime, connecting it to that of illegal immigration." Highlighting the potential for immigration to develop into a non-partisan and a cross class and cross party 3 Piero Ignazi, correctly, emphasizes that "Alleanza Nazionale is no longer the Italian exponent of rightwing extremism. In the last decade it has been moving with increasing speed over the last few years, towards moderate-conservative territory." He continues: "The void left by AN has been occupied by the Lega Nord. The Lega's more and more aggressive statements and demonstrations against foreigners and especially Muslim immigrants contrast with the soft attitude adopted by Alleanza Nazionale. 
A New Immigration Law for Italy: immigration, exclusion, and integration
There is no doubt that these growing concerns over immigration would prove vital for subsequent immigrant legislation. However, until 1998 these developments did not substantively influence governing attitudes towards immigration policy. Rather, it could be argued that immigration policy was becoming increasingly comprehensive and progressive. This appeared to be the case especially after the Olive Tree won the 1996 national elections. Although, the Martelli Law (1990) was a step forward from Law 943 (1986), it still did not adequately address work quotas and civil and social rights for immigrants. It became immediately apparent to the new government that it needed to update the Martelli Law.
In the initial process of drafting the immigration legislation, the unions, left-wing immigrant advocacy groups, and Catholic organizations were influential in pushing for measure that would encourage legalization and integration of immigrants. However, as the drafting of the legislation progressed other forces began to exert and influence the policy process, demanding a more legalistic approach in order to control illegal immigration. External pressure from the European Union demanded more control of illegal immigration in order for Italy to comply with the Schengen accord. Domestically, local mayors-influenced by a growing fear of immigration and perceived links to crime-pushed for stronger law and order provisions. The center-left was caught in a dilemma: it needed to respond to coalition forces on the left of the Olive Tree, and left wing social movements, which can be characterized by a position of solidarity with immigrants. And it was also pressured by local and international pressures that focused on law and order (Zincone 2002 and Di Gregorio, 22-7) .
The defeat of the left in the 1999 Bologna mayor elections demonstrated that the left's fear that more and more center-left voters were open to a center-right discourse of law and order were not completely unfounded. The city of Bologna, within the "red" region of Emilia-Romagna, was an infamous communist stronghold. Although immigration and crime were not the only election issue, the historic defeat of the left in the Bologna municipal elections can be attributed to public perceptions that the right was better at addressing issues such as immigration, crime, and law and order. The Turco-Napolitano immigration law was finally passed in 1998. The TurcoNapolitano law targeted better planning of entry flows. It increased measures against illegal immigrants and criminal exploitation of immigrants by human traffickers. And finally, it increased integration measures. The Law also has "a range of social measures, with better administrative coordination and more financial resources, covering health, education, assistance to minors, and to women (Hine, ."
Although it is necessary not to overestimate the influence that law and order issues and growing fear of immigration exerted on the new immigration law, there is no question that external pressure and the politicization of immigration played an important role in increasing penalties for trafficking and provisions that made it easier to expel illegal immigrants. The most important changes to the Martelli Law highlight the governments attempt to facilitate integration while not wanting to appear weak vis-à-vis illegal immigrants and law and order.
For the first time in the evolution of Italian immigration policy the decision process was influenced by deepening concerns over immigration, by the politicization of immigration by new social actors within civil society, and by radical right populist forces such as the Lega Nord. The 1998 immigration law must be viewed as an attempt to strike a compromise between the powerful lobby that supported the weak within society and the business associations that recognized the need for foreign workers and the demands of citizens, expressed in public opinion and local official, who called for more controls of illegal immigration (Zincone 2002 and Di Gregorio, 27) . Two leading experts on Italian racism, she points out that interviews with PDS and MSI voters confirms that right-wing voters, not surprisingly, were more fearful of immigrants, claiming that they threatened security, employment, and national identity. However, the author also, importantly, concludes that latent racism, especially among less educated and among non-party militants, was equally as prevalent on both the right and the left. 4 This highlights the potential for an electoral dilemma for the left.
immigration proclaim that the new law was better able to address issues of integration, the rights of immigrants in Italy, while it also sets up more realistic quotas for granting work permits. However, not unlike recent trends in the rest of Western Europe, it also has strengthened provisions to control illegal immigration, simplifying the ability of the government to expel illegal residence (Colombo and Sciortino, 2003, 165) . Zincone, 2002, 57) .
Once the House of Liberties formed the government, one of its first priorities was to change Italy's immigration law. However, this would not prove to be an easy task. On the right, the Lega called for zero immigration, linking immigration with a radical Islam and an unwanted multicultural society, which we have seen was not typical of all right of center parties. Alleanza Nazionale, positioned itself somewhere in the middle, linking immigration to crime, but also more aware that it was not possible to stop immigration.
Its position can be characterized as reluctant acceptance with an emphasis on integration (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 963) . The other central actor was the coalition of center-right Christian democratic forces. The Christian democrats demanded an amnesty for domestic workers at a bare minimum, even though their ultimate goal was a general amnesty. This
Christian democratic position was, in part, due to pressures from catholic organizations, while it was also part and parcel of its humanitarian philosophy vis-à-vis immigration.
5
The other important political forces that the government had to take into consideration were the national and the regional employer associations. Entrepreneurial and employers associations were, of course, natural allies of the center-right. However, these associations often sharply disagreed with policy that would limit the ability to recruit and employ immigrant labour. For example, the influential Venetian entrepreneurs publicly voiced their objections to the Lega's proposed attempts to limit immigration, claiming that cuts to immigration would severely hamper their ability to conduct business. Rossi Luciani, the leader of the Venetian wing of Confindustria (the national employers association) proclaimed that "the lack of a serious open immigration policy that is not based on demagogy puts at risk the very survival of the north-eastern economic system." In particular, he was critical of the rigidity of the law, especially provisions that required workers to leave the country after losing their jobs. Instead, he demanded an immigration policy that was more flexible and more suited for the current economic reality (Guolo, 891) . It is now possible to receive a work permit only if the applicant first secures a job and a place of residence, and if the employer can guarantee return passage if the new arrival does not have work. Non-EU citizens are no longer able to qualify for entrance visas in order to come to Italy to seek employment. Sponsoring a person without a preimmigration job in Italy is also no longer possible. Instead, entry into Italy is only possible if an employer, through one of the newly created local immigration centers, puts in a specific request for a specific quantity of workers and/or a type of worker, or for a specific individual. As soon as the work permit runs out, the person, if he or she does not find a new job, must return home (Colombo and Sciortino, .
Much to the public disappointment of the Lega, a general amnesty was achieved.
Here the Christian democrats achieved their goal. However, in exchange it was also declared that immigrants would be fingerprinted and that the navy would be used to patrol the coast for illegal immigrants. Exchanging the latter two amendments to the Bossi-Fini law for the general amnesty was as much about appearing tough on immigration as it was about tangible control of migration (Colombo and Sciortino, 211) .
In the final analysis, the center-right coalition also needed to address a series of contradictory pressures exerted by political parties within the coalition and by political and social forces within civil society. The Bossi-Fini Law was a compromise between two political parties on opposite sides of the immigration issue: on the one side, the Lega pushed for stricter immigration controls, while, on the other, there were the Christian democratic voices that demanded the legalization of illegal immigrants with permanent employment. To be sure, these political parties were not immune to pressures from civil society. Pressure was put on the House of Liberties by demonstrations demanding zero tolerance towards immigrants (often organized by the Lega Nord), by Catholic associations who supported the rights of immigrants, and by business associations that needed immigrant labour. More comparative analysis is needed. However, it does appear that similar tensions exist within the left and the right in other European countries. The question is whether these tensions will be exploited. Western Europe is currently a prime landing destination for migrants. Issues of integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism challenge the very identity of Europe. The degree to which the left and the right will be able to
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